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THE SECOND DECADE OF TITLE VII: REFINEMENT OF
THE REMEDIES
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 was intended to assure
for all citizens of the United States the right to equal employment
opportunities without regard to "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. ' 2 Its enactment was a milestone in the course of the
same general social movement that produced the landmark decision
of Brown v. Board of Education.3 As such, Title VII has effected
major changes in the nation's employment practices, although it is
now apparent that some aspects of those changes most likely were
unforeseen when the Act became effective. During the first decade
under the Act, it was discovered that violations of the Act could be
found in facially neutral employment practices; it seems likely at
this time that the second decade will be marked by confrontation
of difficult questions concerning the appropriate judicial, adminis-
trative, and labor relations remedies for curing the employment
practices that have been found discriminatory.
An Overview of Title Vi
The objective of Title VII was the protection of the rights of "mi-
nority" citizens to an equal opportunity for jobs and later promo-
tions. The initial statute prohibited discrimination by employers,'
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. II, 1972).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. I1, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. The amended Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
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employment agencies, 5 and labor organizations.8 In the 1972 amend-
ments to Title VII, 7 the prohibitions of the Act were extended to
state, county, and municipal governing bodies.8 As originally pro-
posed, the statute was to provide coverage only to those individuals
who were subjected to discriminatory treatment on the basis of race,
color, religion, or national origin.' Sex was added later to these
categories, 0 but the proposed inclusion of age as a prohibited basis
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to
classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."
6. The amended Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for member-
ship, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970).
7. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). For a general discussion of the 1972 Act, see
Sape & Hart, Title WI Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40
GEO. WAsH. L. Rav. 824 (1972).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (Supp. II, 1972).
9. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Seass. 2 (1963).
10. It would appear that the prohibition against sex discrimination was not included to
protect women, but rather was an attempt by the opponents of the Act to complicate its
provisions and thus assist in its defeat. The inclusion of "sex" in Title VII was proposed by
Representative Smith (D-Va.) in the House Rules Committee. The only Congressmen vocally
supporting the amendment all voted against the final bill. 110 CONG. REc. 2804-05 (1964).
However, every Congressman voicing opposition to the sex amendment voted for the Civil
Rights Act. Id. at 2804. See also Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to
Interpret Title VIr of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 Duxa LJ. 671, 677; Comment, Sex
Discrimination in Employment or Can Nettie Play Professional Football?, 4 U. SAN FaAN. L.
REv. 323, 334 (1970); 32 OHio ST. L.J. 923, 929 (1971).
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for discrimination was rejected."
A new federal agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC), was created to implement the congressional man-
date of equal opportunity in the labor market.12 The EEOC's au-
thority was constrained, however, by denying the Commission the
ability to sue in federal court 3 or to issue cease-and-desist orders.'4
Instead the agency was limited to seeking conciliation agreements
between the parties and to issuing right-to-sue letters to grievants. 5
Title VII specifically places the ultimate authority for protecting
equal employment opportunities in the federal judiciary.'" As the
final arbiter of discrimination disputes, the courts to this date have
been unwilling to defer to the arbitration process'" or to state admin-
istrative agencies.'8 Although a number of preliminary steps are
provided by the Act in order to permit EEOC conciliation efforts,' 9
an adversary determination can be made only through a judicial
proceeding. Thus the courts have been very liberal in permitting
class actions, 1 ordering preliminary relief,2' and employing a broad
scope of proof and pretrial discovery.Y
11. Amendment to Section 704(a)(1) of H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970). However, the EEOC was empowered to bring civil suits
by the 1972 amendments to Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. 11, 1972).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970). The 1972 amendments, while continuing to recognize a
private party's right of action, authorize the EEOC to bring suit in federal district court
against a nongovernmental employer who refuses to discontinue voluntarily a discriminatory
employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. I, 1972).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. 11, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
17. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). See also Isaacson & Zifchak,
Fair Employment Forums After Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.: Separate and Unequal,
16 Wht. & MARY L. Rnv. 439 (1975).
18. Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct.
1127 (1975).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, e-6 (Supp. 11, 1972).
20. See generally Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Oatis
v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
21. See generally United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969); Penn-
sylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified on other grounds, 473 F.2d
1029 (3d Cir. 1973).
22. See generally Rios v. Local 638, Steamfitters, 326 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Baxter
v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 46 F.R.D. 56 (S.D. Ga. 1969); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC,
295 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Ga. 1968), aff'd, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Building & Constr. Trades Council, 271 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
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The First Decade of Title VII
The period from 1964 to 1974 marked a major change, not only in
the composition of the national work force, but, perhaps more im-
portantly, in the attitudes and personnel policies of those involved
in the labor market. It was a decade in which employment expecta-
tions and opportunities of classes protected under Title VII, particu-
larly blacks and women, were expanded greatly. Employers and
unions were forced to reconsider carefully their standards for hiring,
promotion, and membership. It became increasingly obvious as the
enforcement of Title V11 expanded that the initial congressional
conception of employment discrimination as an overt policy by
employers was in error.? Rather, litigation has brought the realiza-
tion that most discriminatory practices are the result of longstand-
ing procedures which, while nondiscriminatory on their face, ad-
versely affect minority groups.2
The first decade of Title VII can be characterized as a period
during which the courts were confronted primarily with the need to
determine what actions constituted illegal discrimination within the
meaning of the Act. Concurrently, there was a need for the courts
to clarify a number of procedural uncertainties in order to develop
effective mechanisms to resolve allegations of employment discrimi-
nation.
During the first 10 years, the courts thus attempted to answer
many of the basic questions concerning what constitutes race dis-
crimination,s sex discrimination, 26 religious discrimination, 2 and
23. Sape, The Use of Numerical Quotas To Achieve Integration in Employment, 16 W.
& MARY L. REv. 481, 482 (1975).
24. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
25. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (racially biased testing);
United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973) (seniority); United States
v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973) (testing, seniority); Moody v. Albemarle
Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973) (testing); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971) (seniority); United States v. Local 36, Sheet Metal Workers, 416
F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969) (union discrimination); Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Workers
v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (union discrimination).
26. See generally Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (marital
status); Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (customer
preference); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) (weight-lifting
limitations); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (weight-
lifting limitations); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La.
1971) (hour restrictions).
27. See generally King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 7 FEP Cases 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Dewey
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discrimination based upon national origin.2s Likewise the courts
have established that a statistical showing of disparity between the
composition of the employer's work force and the surrounding popu-
lation will support a prima facie case of discrimination,"9 and that
statistics alone at times may prove a violation." In line with the
reliance upon statistical evidence, the courts furthermore have held
that proof of intent to discriminate is not required,31 and that fa-
cially neutral practices are unlawful if they perpetuate the effects
of past discrimination.32
The Second Decade: Remedies for Discrimination
If the first decade can be viewed as primarily devoted to deter-
mining what constitutes a violation, it appears that the second de-
cade of Title VII will focus upon the equally difficult issue of deter-
mining legal and effective methods for assuring to all workers the
equal opportunities mandated by the Act and remedying the dam-
age done by practies deemed to be discriminatory. No other area of
Title VII enforcement is more important to employers, employees,
and unions, or more controversial, because it is the remedies devel-
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), alf'd, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Shaffield v.
Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Claybaugh v.
Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973).
28. See generally Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
29. See United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 471 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Local 169, Carpenters, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 444 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1971). In
United States v. Local 86, Ironworkers, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), the court stated: 'It is
our belief that the often-stated aphorism, 'statistics often tell much and courts listen,' has
particular application in Title V3I cases." Id. at 551.
30. See Reed v. Arlington Hotel, Inc., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1973); Parham v. Southwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
31. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Local 189, Papermakers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Clark v. American
Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1969).
32. Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 954 (1971) (no transfer policy); Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (seniority devices); United States v. Local
36, Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969) (work experience criteria for job
referrals).
This principle was adopted by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 430 (1970), the Court stating: "Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on
their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannotbe maintained if they operate to 'freeze'
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."
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oped in the recovery stage that will have the most far reaching
impact upon the national labor market.
The purpose of this Symposium, therefore, is to facilitate the
resolution of problems raised by the enforcement of Title VII, focus-
ing upon the present and potential difficulties inherent in fashion-
ing appropriate remedies. The Articles included address the future
role of arbitration as a forum for resolving discrimination disputes,-
the use of quotas in hiring and promotion, 34 and the "recovery"
aspects of Title VII class actions. Also included is an evaluation
by practitioners of the administrative remedies provided by EEOC
regulations36 and a summary of the most recent judicial refinements
of employment discrimination remedies."
33. Isaacson & Zifchak, Fair Employment Forums After Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.:
Separate and Unequal, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 439 (1975).
34. Sape, The Use of Numerical Quotas To Achieve Integration in Employment, 16 Wmi.
& MARY L. REv. 481 (1975).
35. Barnard, Title VII Class Actions: The "Recovery Stage", 16 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 507
(1975).
36. Elisburg, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Procedural Regulations: An
Evaluation by the Practicing Bar, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 555 (1975).
37. Levitt, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: A Review of Significant Recent Decisions, 16
WM. & MARY L. REv. 529 (1975).
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